START ratification failure will not completely reverse the progress in U.S.-Russia relations
Robert Legvold, the Director of Soviet Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, assesses the impact of the recent Congressional elections in the USA on the future of Russia-U.S. relations.
Q: The first question is how the Republican gains in the Congressional elections will impact Russian-U.S. relations?
Legvold: I think that’s uncertain. The first and most important issue is ratification of the follow-on START I agreement, and the likelihood is that it will be taken up in the so-called lame duck session, that is between now and the new year when the new Congress is inaugurated, which means that during that period the Senate remains the same as it is today. And my understanding is that the administration feels it has worked out most of the compromises necessary to get ratification. If, however, the shadow of the election, the implications of this surge to the Republican side, affects that psychology and the Republicans in the Senate begin to re-examine whatever the arrangements are, then the first effect of the election could be to damage the chances of ratification during the lame duck session.
Secondly, on the same question, ratification of the START I follow-on: if it is not ratified in the lame duck session, if it fails during that period or the administration decides not to push the issue, then in the new Congress, I think, the environment will be very unfavorable. And then I grow quite pessimistic about the chances of ratification. And while I do not believe the failure of ratification will completely reverse the progress in U.S.-Russia relations, it will be a significant setback. It will be a political setback for President Medvedev, who has made the improvement of U.S.-Russia relations a signature issue in his foreign policy, and it will be a political setback for Obama, who will be seen as weaker in attempting to deliver on elements in the relationship.
As for the larger set of issues in the relationship, I don’t think it’s going to have an immediate impact on, for example, the progress we’re making in beginning to develop an economic relationship and to increase areas of cooperation on energy. I don’t think it will affect the cooperation that now exists on Afghanistan, and even the evolution of U.S. and Russian approaches to Iran on the nuclear weapons issue. So I think the immediate effect will be on the issue of ratifying START I.
Q: So the second question is, do the results of the elections highlight the disapproval of Obama’s course including his foreign policy? Can the reset of Russia-U.S. relations be one of the reasons for this disapproval?
Legvold: The short answer is no. Foreign policy in general figured very insignificantly in this election. The issues were overwhelmingly domestic issues. And among those, the dominant consideration was the state of the economy and the frustration that a large number of Americans feel about what they think is happening to their country on the inside. Not even a potentially partisan issue, such as the wars the United States is pursuing in Iraq and Afghanistan, was important. The U.S.-Russia relationship was literally not an issue in the election. I don’t think any candidate that I knew of made any kind of an issue around the U.S.-Russia relationship.
Q: And the last question is how do you assess the election of radical right-wing congressmen from the Tea Party? Can it be a sign of an upcoming return of the policy of isolation?
Legvold: I don’t think that the success of the Tea Party, primarily in Congressional races, less so in Senate races – they were for the most part defeated in Senate races, but in governor’s races and in the Congressional races they were very successful – but I don’t think it had anything to do with isolationism. The Tea Party movement is principally about developments within the United States, and you do not get a strong sentiment for the United States to retrench or pull back from foreign policy commitments. You don’t even have much sentiment within the Tea Party movement criticizing allies for being weak or unsupportive, which is another element of new isolationism. And within the Tea Party you don’t have any specific criticism that I’ve seen of the Obama Administration’s willingness to engage adversaries such as Iran or Libya or countries of that sort, even to some degree Cuba. It’s more a social political, domestic political movement than it is a movement that has to do with the U.S. role abroad. I do think that given the preoccupation with domestic issues and a desire to roll back government, the size of government, that it will have an indirect effect on the capacity of the United States to engage abroad. But that’s different from reinforcing a sentiment that the United States ought to withdraw into a kind of “Fortress America,” into isolationism. So I would not link those two things.
Q: Thank you very much for your comments.
By Robert Legvold
source: The Valdai Discussion Club
http://valdaiclub.com/content/start-ratification-failure-will-not-completely-reverse-progress-us-russia-relations
Q: The first question is how the Republican gains in the Congressional elections will impact Russian-U.S. relations?
Legvold: I think that’s uncertain. The first and most important issue is ratification of the follow-on START I agreement, and the likelihood is that it will be taken up in the so-called lame duck session, that is between now and the new year when the new Congress is inaugurated, which means that during that period the Senate remains the same as it is today. And my understanding is that the administration feels it has worked out most of the compromises necessary to get ratification. If, however, the shadow of the election, the implications of this surge to the Republican side, affects that psychology and the Republicans in the Senate begin to re-examine whatever the arrangements are, then the first effect of the election could be to damage the chances of ratification during the lame duck session.
Secondly, on the same question, ratification of the START I follow-on: if it is not ratified in the lame duck session, if it fails during that period or the administration decides not to push the issue, then in the new Congress, I think, the environment will be very unfavorable. And then I grow quite pessimistic about the chances of ratification. And while I do not believe the failure of ratification will completely reverse the progress in U.S.-Russia relations, it will be a significant setback. It will be a political setback for President Medvedev, who has made the improvement of U.S.-Russia relations a signature issue in his foreign policy, and it will be a political setback for Obama, who will be seen as weaker in attempting to deliver on elements in the relationship.
As for the larger set of issues in the relationship, I don’t think it’s going to have an immediate impact on, for example, the progress we’re making in beginning to develop an economic relationship and to increase areas of cooperation on energy. I don’t think it will affect the cooperation that now exists on Afghanistan, and even the evolution of U.S. and Russian approaches to Iran on the nuclear weapons issue. So I think the immediate effect will be on the issue of ratifying START I.
Q: So the second question is, do the results of the elections highlight the disapproval of Obama’s course including his foreign policy? Can the reset of Russia-U.S. relations be one of the reasons for this disapproval?
Legvold: The short answer is no. Foreign policy in general figured very insignificantly in this election. The issues were overwhelmingly domestic issues. And among those, the dominant consideration was the state of the economy and the frustration that a large number of Americans feel about what they think is happening to their country on the inside. Not even a potentially partisan issue, such as the wars the United States is pursuing in Iraq and Afghanistan, was important. The U.S.-Russia relationship was literally not an issue in the election. I don’t think any candidate that I knew of made any kind of an issue around the U.S.-Russia relationship.
Q: And the last question is how do you assess the election of radical right-wing congressmen from the Tea Party? Can it be a sign of an upcoming return of the policy of isolation?
Legvold: I don’t think that the success of the Tea Party, primarily in Congressional races, less so in Senate races – they were for the most part defeated in Senate races, but in governor’s races and in the Congressional races they were very successful – but I don’t think it had anything to do with isolationism. The Tea Party movement is principally about developments within the United States, and you do not get a strong sentiment for the United States to retrench or pull back from foreign policy commitments. You don’t even have much sentiment within the Tea Party movement criticizing allies for being weak or unsupportive, which is another element of new isolationism. And within the Tea Party you don’t have any specific criticism that I’ve seen of the Obama Administration’s willingness to engage adversaries such as Iran or Libya or countries of that sort, even to some degree Cuba. It’s more a social political, domestic political movement than it is a movement that has to do with the U.S. role abroad. I do think that given the preoccupation with domestic issues and a desire to roll back government, the size of government, that it will have an indirect effect on the capacity of the United States to engage abroad. But that’s different from reinforcing a sentiment that the United States ought to withdraw into a kind of “Fortress America,” into isolationism. So I would not link those two things.
Q: Thank you very much for your comments.
By Robert Legvold
source: The Valdai Discussion Club
http://valdaiclub.com/content/start-ratification-failure-will-not-completely-reverse-progress-us-russia-relations
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