A simpler era in EU-Russia relations? | European Voice
A simpler era in EU-Russia relations? | European Voice
The leaked cables reveal how deeply Russia is willing to co-operate with the West on Iran, for example, and in the ‘secret world' of the intelligence services.
Deep co-operation co-exists with deep differences.
Little illustrates the seemingly unbridgeable differences between the West and Russia better than an image contained in the WikiLeaks file of US cables – the image of Chechnya's brutal president, Ramzan Kadyrov, dancing “clumsily with his gold-plated automatic stuck down in the back of his jeans”. And yet the leaked cables also reveal how deeply Russia is willing to co-operate with the West on Iran, for example, and in the ‘secret world' of the intelligence services.
That deep co-operation can co-exist with deep differences is in part thanks to a willingness to put aside old differences and approaches. Both the US and Poland have ‘re-set' relations with Russia. Russia has reciprocated and is being more honest about history (most notably, about the Katyn massacres). It is also re-setting relations with, for example, Belarus and Ukraine, thinning out the privileges – chiefly, subsidies – that it grants them.
This amounts to a simplification of relationships – and that simplification is aided by a loss of illusions and a shedding of pretence.
Few in Europe, surely, have any illusions left about the rule of law in Russia or the prospects for democracy. When Mikhail Khodorkovsky is sentenced a second time, probably on 15 December, it will be seen for what it is: part of a transfer of assets from Russia's former richest man to the elite favoured by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Europe's leaders contributed much to the illusions. They overstated the prospects of change in Russia. Some may also have violated human rights in their pursuit of the ‘war on terror' and viewed violations in Chechnya as part of that war. Now, no EU leader, other than Silvio Berlusconi, is quite as friendly with or as enthusiastic about Russia as leaders were in the early 2000s.
Greater understanding of several points would help the EU. First, Russia may claim Ukraine and Belarus as part of a “sphere of privileged interests”, but Belarus's Alyaksandr Lukashenka and Ukraine's Viktor Yanukovych prefer independence to dependence on Russia. Second, the EU needs Russian energy, but Russia needs the EU market. Third, a unified front matters. Still, there is a greater appreciation of these points now than in the past.
Disingenuousness and hypocrisy continue to thrive, of course. Putin's suggestion last Thursday of a vast Lisbon-to-Vladivostok free-trade zone was an example of the former; an example of the latter was his claim on Friday that aspects of the EU's liberalisation of its energy market amount to “robbery”.
But such ploys and words are now less likely to complicate the development of the relationship. The building site remains very messy, but a new order has largely been constructed: the EU and NATO have enlarged to Russia's borders, Russia now has a pact with NATO, and, at their summit on 6 December, Russia and the EU will sign agreements that should bring Russia very close to accession to the World Trade Organization. Pipelines for Russian energy are being built; and the EU has plans to bolster its energy security.
There is, therefore, less justification for the EU to indulge Russian demands for a relationship of privileged interests as it pursues its new ‘partnership for modernisation'. The principal basis for that modernisation is very different in EU eyes (rule-based reform) and in Russian eyes (EU money and technology). Why should the EU allow Russia to sidestep questions about reform when, for example, Western companies were (like Khodorkovsky) burnt by the asset transfer?
The challenges to modernisation are now primarily on Russia's side, and those challenges have been characterised best by Medvedev: “stagnation” and “legal nihilism”.
There is little the EU can do about Russia's “stagnation”. But it can do something about its “legal nihilism”.
First, it can avoid repeats of its own failings during the ‘war on terror'. And, second, it must – for its businesses, for its citizens and for Russia's – try to introduce as many rules and as much law into the relationship as it can. Law is Russia's bridge to Europe.
source: A simpler era in EU-Russia relations? | European Voice
The leaked cables reveal how deeply Russia is willing to co-operate with the West on Iran, for example, and in the ‘secret world' of the intelligence services.
Deep co-operation co-exists with deep differences.
Little illustrates the seemingly unbridgeable differences between the West and Russia better than an image contained in the WikiLeaks file of US cables – the image of Chechnya's brutal president, Ramzan Kadyrov, dancing “clumsily with his gold-plated automatic stuck down in the back of his jeans”. And yet the leaked cables also reveal how deeply Russia is willing to co-operate with the West on Iran, for example, and in the ‘secret world' of the intelligence services.
That deep co-operation can co-exist with deep differences is in part thanks to a willingness to put aside old differences and approaches. Both the US and Poland have ‘re-set' relations with Russia. Russia has reciprocated and is being more honest about history (most notably, about the Katyn massacres). It is also re-setting relations with, for example, Belarus and Ukraine, thinning out the privileges – chiefly, subsidies – that it grants them.
This amounts to a simplification of relationships – and that simplification is aided by a loss of illusions and a shedding of pretence.
Few in Europe, surely, have any illusions left about the rule of law in Russia or the prospects for democracy. When Mikhail Khodorkovsky is sentenced a second time, probably on 15 December, it will be seen for what it is: part of a transfer of assets from Russia's former richest man to the elite favoured by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Europe's leaders contributed much to the illusions. They overstated the prospects of change in Russia. Some may also have violated human rights in their pursuit of the ‘war on terror' and viewed violations in Chechnya as part of that war. Now, no EU leader, other than Silvio Berlusconi, is quite as friendly with or as enthusiastic about Russia as leaders were in the early 2000s.
Greater understanding of several points would help the EU. First, Russia may claim Ukraine and Belarus as part of a “sphere of privileged interests”, but Belarus's Alyaksandr Lukashenka and Ukraine's Viktor Yanukovych prefer independence to dependence on Russia. Second, the EU needs Russian energy, but Russia needs the EU market. Third, a unified front matters. Still, there is a greater appreciation of these points now than in the past.
Disingenuousness and hypocrisy continue to thrive, of course. Putin's suggestion last Thursday of a vast Lisbon-to-Vladivostok free-trade zone was an example of the former; an example of the latter was his claim on Friday that aspects of the EU's liberalisation of its energy market amount to “robbery”.
But such ploys and words are now less likely to complicate the development of the relationship. The building site remains very messy, but a new order has largely been constructed: the EU and NATO have enlarged to Russia's borders, Russia now has a pact with NATO, and, at their summit on 6 December, Russia and the EU will sign agreements that should bring Russia very close to accession to the World Trade Organization. Pipelines for Russian energy are being built; and the EU has plans to bolster its energy security.
There is, therefore, less justification for the EU to indulge Russian demands for a relationship of privileged interests as it pursues its new ‘partnership for modernisation'. The principal basis for that modernisation is very different in EU eyes (rule-based reform) and in Russian eyes (EU money and technology). Why should the EU allow Russia to sidestep questions about reform when, for example, Western companies were (like Khodorkovsky) burnt by the asset transfer?
The challenges to modernisation are now primarily on Russia's side, and those challenges have been characterised best by Medvedev: “stagnation” and “legal nihilism”.
There is little the EU can do about Russia's “stagnation”. But it can do something about its “legal nihilism”.
First, it can avoid repeats of its own failings during the ‘war on terror'. And, second, it must – for its businesses, for its citizens and for Russia's – try to introduce as many rules and as much law into the relationship as it can. Law is Russia's bridge to Europe.
source: A simpler era in EU-Russia relations? | European Voice
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